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Canada’s Obligations under the Charter
and the ICCPR

Climate change is expected to have an unprecedented impact on human migration
and displacement over the next decade. Individuals forced to migrate on the
basis of climate change or natural disasters remain, however, on the periphery
of international and domestic environmental and refugee protections. Teitiota, a
landmark decision by the UN Human Rights Committee (the Committee) in 2020
could, however, point the way toward filling these legal gaps by using the principle
of non-refoulement under human rights law to prevent the deportation of those
whose lives are at risk. As such, this paper seeks to explore the application of
Teitiota to the Canadian context. The goal is to assess Teitiota’s potential impact
on Charter jurisprudence and examine positive steps that Canada may take to
build a framework around transnational climate change and disaster displacement.

Les changements climatiques devraient avoir un impact sans précédent sur les
migrations et les déplacements humains au cours de la prochaine décennie.
Les personnes contraintes de migrer en raison des changements climatiques
ou de catastrophes naturelles restent toutefois à la périphérie des protections
internationales et nationales en matière d’environnement et de réfugiés. Teitiota,
une décision historique du Comité des droits de l’homme des Nations unies (le
Comité) rendue en 2020, pourrait toutefois montrer la voie pour combler ces lacunes
juridiques en utilisant le principe de non-refoulement en vertu des lois relatives aux
droits de l’homme pour empêcher l’expulsion de ceux dont la vie est en danger.
Ainsi, le présent article cherche à explorer l’application de Teitiota dans le contexte
canadien. L’objectif est d’évaluer l’impact potentiel de Teitiota sur la jurisprudence
touchant la Charte et d’examiner les mesures positives que le Canada peut
prendre pour construire un cadre autour des changements climatiques à l’échelle
internationale et des déplacements en raison des catastrophes.

*
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Introduction
Climate change is expected to have an unprecedented impact on human
migration and displacement1 over the next decade.2 In 2021, extreme
weather and weather-related events resulted in about 22.3 million
displacements in 140 countries.3 By 2050, according to estimates,
some 200 million people could be displaced.4 The need to address the
connection between climate change and migration is obvious and urgent.
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees has called climate
change “the defining crisis of our time and disaster displacement one of
its most devastating consequences.”5 Yet there remain significant gaps in
legal protections, both nationally and internationally.6 People forced to
migrate due to climate change and natural disasters often fall outside the
scope of refugee protections and are left on the periphery of international
environmental agreements.7
1.
Richard Perruchoud & Jillyanne Redpath-Cross, eds, Glossary on Migration, 2nd ed
(Geneva: International Organization of Migration, 2011), online (pdf): <www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/
observaciones/11/anexo5.pdf> [perma.cc/3R9X-3W8P]: The International Organization for Migration
defines migration as “[t]he movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international
border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people,
whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons,
economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification” at 62-63.
By contrast, displacement is a form of migration, defined as “[a] forced removal of a person from his
or her home or country, often due to armed conflict or natural disasters” at 29.
2.
Jane McAdam, “Introduction” in Jane McAdam, ed, Climate Change and Displacement
(Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 1 [McAdam, “Introduction”]; Oli Brown, Migration and
Climate Change” (Geneva, International Organization for Migration, 2008) at 11-12, 21-22, online:
<www.researchgate.net/publication/253396962_Migration_and_Climate_Change>
[perma.cc/
DWN2-EX27]; Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons
in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: Volume I” (December 2015) at 17-18, online
(pdf): Platform on Disaster Displacement <disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf> [perma.cc/PMG5-ZLJV].
3.
“Global Report on Internal Displacement: 2022” (2022) at 16, online (pdf): Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre <www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/
documents/IDMC_GRID_2022_LR.pdf> [perma.cc/DAS6-XL3U].
4.
Katrina Miriam Wyman, “Responses to Climate Migration” (2013) 37:1 Harv Envtl L Rev 167
at 168, online: <harvardelr.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2013/05/Wyman.pdf> [perma.cc/BF55Z7BN]; Nina Höing & Jona Razzaque “Unacknowledged and Unwanted? ‘Environmental Refugees’ in
Search of Legal Status” (2012) 8:1 J Global Ethics 19 at 19, DOI: <10.1080/17449626.2011.635691>;
“Groundswell Acting on Internal Migration Part 2” (2021) at xxii, online: World Bank Group <
file:///C:/Users/mgalloway/Downloads/Groundswell%20Part%20II.pdf>.
5.
“Climate change and disaster displacement” (last visited 25 July 2022), online: United Nations
High Commission for Refugees <www.unhcr.org/uk/climate-change-and-disasters.html> [perma.cc/
Z6PW-L366].
6.
Höing & Razzaque, supra note 4 at 21-26; Lauren Nishimura, “‘Climate Change Migrants’:
Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change
Adaptation Strategies” (2015) 27:1 Intl J Refugee L 107, DOI: <10.1093/ijrl/eev002>.
7.
As discussed further below, the nature of the risk faced by those fleeing the impacts of climate
change, makes it unlikely that they will be considered refugees under current legal definition under the
United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention unless they face an additional form of persecution. While
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A landmark decision by the UN Human Rights Committee (the
Committee) in 2020 could, however, point the way toward filling these
legal gaps by using the principle of non-refoulement under human rights
law to prevent the deportation of those whose lives are at risk.8 In the
decision, referred to here as Teitiota, the Committee held for the first time
that the effects of climate change, natural disasters, or both could, in certain
circumstances, trigger a country’s non-refoulement obligations, preventing
it from sending individuals back to circumstances that would make a risk
to life, including the right to life with dignity, reasonably foreseeable.9
In short, the Committee affirmed that states have international human
rights obligations not to return individuals to countries where the impact
of climate change is such that doing so would violate their right to life
or expose them to a risk of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The
Committee based its decision in Teitiota on article 6(1), the right to life,
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The ICCPR is a key international human rights instrument and one
which Canada has ratified and thereby bound itself to.10 At present,
however, there are no specific provisions in Canadian immigration and
refugee law that cover individuals who might seek protection on such
grounds. As such, this paper seeks to examine how, and whether, Teitiota
and the international human rights obligations under the ICCPR could
inform and affect Canada’s constitutional protections under the Charter
for those migrating due to the life-threatening impacts of the climate crisis.
In this sense, Teitiota offers an opportunity to revisit the intersection of

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change focuses on climate change prevention
and adaptation it does not explicitly mention environmental or climate migration.
8.
Jane McAdam, “Protecting People Displaced by the Impacts of Climate Change: The UN
Human Rights Committee and the Principle of Non-Refoulement” (2020) 114:4 Am J Int Law 708,
DOI: <10.1017/ajil.2020.31> [McAdam, “Protecting People Displaced”].
9.
Human Rights Committee, Teitiota v New Zealand, Communication No 2728/2016, UNCCPROR,
127th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (2019) at para 9.3 [Teitiota], online (pdf): <documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/237/12/PDF/G2023712.pdf?OpenElement>
[perma.cc/
NUW5-NQ93]; Kate Lyons “Climate refugees can’t be returned home, says landmark UN human
rights ruling” The Guardian (20 January 2020), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/
climate-refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling> [perma.cc/5CWE4LXU]; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Historic UN Human Rights
case opens door to climate change asylum claims” (21 January 2020), online: UN <www.ohchr.org/en/
press-releases/2020/01/historic-un-human-rights-case-opens-door-climate-change-asylum-claims>
[perma.cc/96ZS-F7HX]; “UN landmark case for people displaced by climate change” (20 January
2020), online: Amnesty International <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/un-landmark-casefor-people-displaced-by-climate-change/> [perma.cc/9YL8-QS2H].
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 art
6(1), Can TS 1976 No 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976)
[ICCPR].
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international human rights law, climate change displacement, and Canadian
immigration and refugee law.
The paper is organized into four parts.
Part I will provide an overview of the key issues in Teitiota, a case that
focused on Kiribati national Mr. Ioane Tetiota’s failed asylum application
to New Zealand (the Republic of Kiribati is an independent island nation
in the Central Pacific Ocean). Mr. Teitiota’s case is illustrative of two
critical issues within the field of climate change migration and disaster
displacement. First, why those seeking asylum on the basis of the impact
of climate change often fall outside of the scope of refugee protections.
Second, the potential for human rights law to address the current limitations
in the international framework.
Part II will examine how the ICCPR and the Committee’s decision
in Teitiota inform Canada’s international human rights commitments.
In particular, it examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent
pronouncements in Quebec (Attorney General) v 9147-0732 Québec
inc (9147-0732 Québec inc), on the principle of the presumption of
conformity.11 The aforementioned article 6(1) of the ICCPR, which is
relied on in Teitiota, establishes that:
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.12

It is argued that because Canada has ratified the ICCPR, article 6(1)
informs interpretation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,13 which states that:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.14

Part III addresses whether there is space under section 7 of the
Charter, which applies to everyone in Canada, regardless of citizenship,
to vindicate the human rights articulated in Teitiota for those whose life is
at risk due to climate change.15

11. 2020 SCC 32 [Québec inc].
12. ICCPR, supra note 10, art 6(1).
13. Québec inc, supra note 11 at paras 31-39.
14. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; ibid at paras 27-33.
15. Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] SCR 177 at para 35, 17 DLR
(4th) 422 [Singh].
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Part IV will examine actions that Parliament can take to protect the
rights of those displaced, building on the previous sections, to show the
need for Canada to develop a comprehensive response to the plight of
transnational climate- and disaster-displaced persons.
Ultimately, the goal is to assess Teitiota’s potential impact on Charter
jurisprudence and examine positive steps that Canada may take to begin
to build a framework around transnational climate change and disaster
displacement.
Methodology
The article is grounded in the view that climate change poses an existential
threat to people around the world. Several empirical studies have already
provided evidence of the links between climate change and migration.16
This research shows that climate change migration is a multifaceted
phenomenon.17 There is no one type of climate change or environmentally
induced migration and displacement. Rather, the way climate change is
experienced varies greatly depending on a population’s vulnerability and its
adaptation capacity. Its impacts constantly interact with economic, social,
political, and cultural factors to produce a range of outcomes. This makes
generalizations around climate migration, although common, dangerous.
It also makes the adaptation of a protection framework to address solely
the impacts of climate change difficult, if not impossible. Climate change
rarely, if ever, acts as the sole driver of migration.18
There is already an existing body of literature on the status of climate
migrants in international law, as well as international discussion of Teitiota.19
16. Benoit Mayer, “Constructing Climate Migration as a Global Governance Issue: Essential Flaws
in the Contemporary Literature” (2013) 9:1 JSDLP 87, online: <www.jstor.org/stable/24352635>
[perma.cc/55KU-Z37Z]; McAdam, “Introduction,” supra note 2 at 3; Gregory White, Climate Change
and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011); Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, eds, Migration and Climate Change
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
17. Jane McAdam, “Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and
Displacement” (2016) 33:2 Windsor YB Access Just 1 at 3, DOI: <10.22329/wyaj.v33i2.4841>
[McAdam, “Building International Approaches”].
18. Mayer, supra note 16 at 111.
19. Christopher Caskey, “Non-Refoulement and Environmental Degradation: Examining the
Entry Points and Improving Access to Protection” (2020), online (pdf): Global Migration Centre
<repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/298830?ln=en> [perma.cc/5FKE-YLKM]; Ginevra Le Moli
“The Human Rights Committee, Environmental Protection and the Right to Life” (2020) 69:3 ICLQ
735, DOI: <10.1017/S0020589320000123>; McAdam, “Protecting People Displaced,” supra note
8; Jefferi Hamzah Sendut, “Climate Change as a Trigger of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under
International Human Rights Law” (6 February 2020), online (blog): EJIL:Talk! <www.ejiltalk.org/
climate-change-as-a-trigger-of-non-refoulement-obligations-under-international-human-rights-law/>
[perma.cc/WC4V-FZAL]; Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent, “Prospects for Protection in Light of the
Human Rights Committee’s Decision in Teitiota v New Zealand” (2016) Polish Migration Rev, online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=3653088> [perma.cc/P35Z-WSV6].

Teitiota v New Zealand, Climate Migration and Non-refoulement…

391

This paper seeks to build on this body of work in the Canadian context by
exploring whether the consequences of deportation caused by the impacts
of climate change could trigger Canada’s human rights obligations not to
return an individual to a situation where there is a reasonably foreseeable
risk to life.20 The focus in such a framework is on the rights deprivations
caused by removal, rather than the underlying cause of the displacement
itself. This is because of the difficulties in establishing a principled
approach to privileging protection for those displaced by climate change
over those who are forced to flee their countries of origin for other severe
rights deprivations such as famine or epidemic.21 It is, however, important
to note that states who have emitted the most greenhouse gases (GHG)
arguably bear moral responsibility for the impacts of climate change on
vulnerable states, discussed further in part IV, below.
Finally, even within the Canadian context, the focus of this paper is on
one specific aspect of a very broad field: domestic protections for disasterand climate-displaced persons who reach Canada. Research shows that
most climate migration occurs within a country’s borders.22 Often, the
people who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change do not
migrate at all. If they do, they migrate only internally because they lack
the capacity or means to leave their countries, or because of their sense
of place.23 Therefore, the following discussion of climate migration will
inevitably not address the needs of such individuals, which is beyond the
scope of this paper.24 But, if Canada is to effectively address this issue
as a totality it will require a framework that takes into account the broad
aspects of climate migration and its many causes and effects, including
internal migration and adaptation, in a proactive, cooperative, and
multidisciplinary manner.25
20. See Alexander Betts, Survival Migration Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Alexander Betts, “Survival Migration: A New Protection
Framework” (2010) 16 Global Governance 361 at 378, online: <www.jstor.org/stable/29764952>
[perma.cc/5QMM-3EBL].
21. Mayer, supra note 16 at 112.
22. Mayer, supra note 16 at 95-96; Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 5 [McAdam, Climate Change].
23. Jessica RZ Simms, “‘Why Would I Live Anyplace Else?’: Resilience, Sense of Place, and
Possibilities of Migration in Coastal Louisiana” (2017) 33:2 J Coastal Research 408, online: <www.
jstor.org/stable/44161446> [perma.cc/7YZT-KBTJ]; Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, “Migration as
Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits” in Jane McAdam, ed, Climate Change and Displacement:
Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2010) 37 at 41; Graeme Hugo,
“Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific” in
Jane McAdam, ed, Climate Change Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, UK: Hart
Publishing, 2010) 9 at 26; Mayer, supra note 16 at 112.
24. Mayer, supra note 16 at 112.
25. For an introduction to policy strategies necessary to develop protections in this area see McAdam,
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I. Teitiota and the United Nations Humans Rights Committee
The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s decision in Teitiota is
based on the complaint made by Ioane Teitiota. Mr. Teitiota was born in
the 1970s in Kiribati. As a young man, he moved to Tarawa, the main
island and capital of Kiribati, where he and his wife eventually settled.
Through the 1990s, life on the island of Tarawa became progressively
more insecure.26 The island’s capacity to carry its population was severely
affected by population growth, urbanization, and a lack of infrastructure
development—in particular water and sanitation infrastructure. All of
these problems were, and are, greatly exacerbated by climate change.27
In 2007, concerned about the situation in Tarawa, Mr. Teitiota and his
wife moved to New Zealand on residence permits.28 The couple stayed in
New Zealand after their residence permits expired in 2010.29 Together,
they have three children born in New Zealand, none of whom are entitled
to New Zealand citizenship.30
In 2012, Mr. Teitiota applied to the government of New Zealand for
refugee status and status as a protected person under the ICCPR on the
basis of “changes to his environment in Kiribati caused by sea-level-rise
associated with climate change.”31 The essence of Mr. Teitiota’s claim
was that, in the near future, rising sea levels and associated environmental
degradation would render Kiribati uninhabitable and force Kiribati
inhabitants to leave their islands.32
1. Mr. Teitiota’s refugee claim
Mr. Teitiota’s refugee claim was denied at first instance by a New Zealand
Refugee and Protection Officer.33 Mr. Teitiota appealed to the New Zealand
Immigration and Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal was
tasked with assessing Mr. Teitiota’s claim to refugee status de novo.34
At the hearing, the Tribunal accepted that the island of Tarawa
specifically, and Kiribati generally, are already experiencing catastrophic
impacts of climate change. These include the effects of slow-onset climate
“Building International Approaches,” supra note 17.
26. AF (Kiribati), [2013] NZIPT 800413 at para 26 [Teitiota NZIPT].
27. Ibid at para 39.
28. Ibid at para 40.
29. Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, [2014] NZCA
173 at para 5 [Teitiota NZCA].
30. Ibid; Medovarski, supra note 109 at para 46.
31. Ibid at para 7, citing Teitiota, NZIPT, supra note 26 at para 2.
32. Teitiota v Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, [2015] NZSC 107 at para 5 [Teitiota
NZSC].
33. Teitiota NZCA, supra note 29 at para 6.
34. Ibid at para 7.
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processes such as sea level rise, which threaten freshwater supplies and
reduce arable land, as well as rapid-onset environmental events such as
storms and persistent flooding, which result in extensive damage and
relocation.35 The Tribunal also acknowledged that limited access to clean
water, land, and means of subsistence, coupled with overpopulation, had
caused tension and led to conflict and land disputes, which had resulted
in physical assaults and deaths.36 Finally, the Tribunal accepted that Mr.
Teitiota’s decision to go to New Zealand was spurred by concerns about
coastal erosion and other effects of climate change in South Tarawa.37
Notwithstanding these findings of fact, the Tribunal held that Mr.
Teitiota did not fall within the meaning of a refugee under the Refugee
Convention.38 This is because, under the 1951 Convention Relation to
the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention) and New Zealand’s
Immigration Act 2009, a refugee is a person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country39

The Tribunal held that to be considered a refugee as defined under
the Convention, a person must face persecution that is a result of human
agency.40 As such, despite the very real risks Mr. Teitiota faced as a result
of the effects of climate change on Kiribati, these risks did not amount to
“persecution” under the Refugee Convention.41
Further, the nature of the risks Mr. Teitiota faced, including rising
sea levels and rapid-onset environmental events, including storms and
flooding, did not result from persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group
so as to bring Mr. Teitiota under the Refugee Convention’s protection.42
35. Teitiota NZIPT, supra note 26 at paras 7, 12-21, 39; Mike Bowers, “Waiting for the tide to
turn: Kiribati’s fight for survival,” The Guardian (23 Oct 2017), online:<www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/oct/23/waiting-for-the-tide-to-turn-kiribatis-fight-for-survival> [perma.cc/27FG-CHU4].
36. Teitiota NZIPT, supra note 26 at paras 15, 39, 72.
37. Ibid at para 40.
38. Ibid at para 52.
39. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 art 1(A)(2) (entered
into force 22 April 1954), online (pdf): <www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/refugees.pdf> [perma.cc/
ZK94-4CEY] [emphasis added]; Immigration Act 2009 (NZ), 2009/51, schedule 1, ch 1, art 1(A)(2).
40. Teitiota NZIPT, supra note 26 at paras 51-54.
41. Ibid at paras 52-54.
42. Novel understandings of persecution that could encompass the negative impacts of climate
change were expressly put to the Tribunal and rejected. Counsel for Mr. Teitiota submitted that fleeing
the effects of climate change, coupled with the state of Kiribati’s inability or unwillingness to deal with
its effects, could constitute “persecution” under the Refugee Convention. Under this perspective, the
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The Tribunal noted that by Mr. Teitiota’s own admission the risks he faced
were risks faced generally by the population of Kiribati, a fact that was
fatal to his refugee claim, as such risks fall outside refugee protection.43
The Tribunal’s decision and approach were upheld by two courts of
appeal and the New Zealand Supreme Court.44 The approach taken by the
New Zealand courts is also consistent with the approach taken by courts in
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.45 The Australian High Court has
held, for example, that, “[n]o matter how devastating may be epidemic, natural
disaster or famine, a person fleeing them is not a refugee within the terms of the
Convention.”46 The Australian Court’s pronouncement was cited approvingly
by the House of Lords in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State.47 Similarly, several
international bodies including the UNCHR and the International Organization
for Migration agree that the term refugee should be avoided in the climate
change and disaster context.48
The Refugee Convention was not created to protect against rights
deprivations or risks to life caused by environmental harms. Analytically,
there is a cogent argument for not overstretching interpretations of the
legal definition of a Convention refugee. That is: while those who flee the
impacts of climate change merit protection, the Refugee Convention may
not be a suitable legal framework for providing it.
There is also significant resistance to the idea of developing a new
international instrument49 or reopening or expanding the Refugee
Convention’s definition of a “refugee” due to a lack of political will and also
due to fears of a retrenchment of protection due to continuing worldwide

“persecutor” could be understood to be the international community, whose actions and inactions have
led to climate change so as to encompass a general worldwide human agency. The Tribunal explicitly
rejected this submission by Mr. Teitiota’s counsel and the submission that persecution for the purposes
of the Refugee Convention could be understood to encompass the act of fleeing irrespective of cause.
See Teitiota NZCA, supra note 29 at para 30. Counsel articulated this perspective clearly in its grounds
for appeal: see Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment,
[2013] NZHC 3125 at para 55 [Teitiota NZHC]. Teitiota NZIPT, supra note 26 at paras 51-54.
43. Teitiota NZIPT, supra note 26 at paras 73-75; Re X, 2019 CanLII 142496 at para 21, [2019]
RADD No 2011 (CAIRB).
44. Teitiota NZHC, supra note 42 at paras 10-11.
45. Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, 103 DLR (4th) 1 [Ward cited to SCR];
Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2000] UKHL 37, [2001] 1 AC 489.
46. Applicant A v Minister of Immigration and Multiethnic Affairs (1997), [1998] INLR 1 at 19, 190
CLR 225 (HCA).
47. [2007] 3 WLR 832 at 844, [2007] UKHL 49.
48. Höing & Razzaque, supra note 4 at 22.
49. Jane McAdam, “From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping
International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement” (2016) 39:4 UNSWLJ
1518 at 1521-1522, online: <www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/39-4-7.
pdf> [perma.cc/8GME-282D] [McAdam, “Shaping International Approaches”].
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polarization of opinion on migration issues.50 The significant resistance
to the development of another international instrument or framework to
specifically address the plight of individuals forcibly displaced by climate
change and natural disasters comes despite increased recognition of the
problem.51 At present, therefore, it appears that human rights law and
instruments such as the ICCPR may hold the greatest potential to address
the gaps in international and domestic frameworks in this respect.
2. Mr. Teitiota’s claim to be recognized as a protected person under the
ICCPR
As an alternative to his refugee claim, Mr. Teitiota claimed status as a
protected person under the ICCPR. The ICCPR is a core international
human rights instrument, protecting civil and political rights, including
the right to life under article 6(1). As previously mentioned, article 6(1)
establishes that:
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.52

Section 131 of New Zealand’s Immigration Act 2009 incorporates the
ICCPR by establishing that:
(1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand
under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial
grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected
to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New
Zealand.53

Mr. Teitiota’s claim to be recognized as a protected person under the
ICCPR focused on the obligation not to deport individuals to places where
there are substantial grounds for believing deportation would violate the
right to life.54 In assessing Mr. Teitiota’s claim, the Tribunal accepted that
the right to life is one of the rights that will be “most directly affected”
by global warming.55 The Tribunal also accepted that the right to life is to
be interpreted broadly so as to include positive duties on states, such as

50. Reed Koenig, “Climate Change’s First Casualties: Migration and Disappearing States”” (2015)
29:3 Geo Immigr LJ 501 at 505-506.
51. McAdam, “Shaping International Approaches,” supra note 49 at 1521-1522..
52. ICCPR, supra note 10, art 6(1).
53. (NZ), 2009/51, s 131.
54. Ibid, s 164(4).
55. Teitiota NZIPT, supra note 26 at para 80.
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the duty to protect individuals from risks associated with known natural
hazards.56
However, the Tribunal found that Mr. Teitiota was not protected under
section 131 of the Immigration Act 2009 because he failed to establish that
any risk to his life as a result of the impacts of climate change on Kiribati
was a sufficiently likely consequence of removal such that it triggered
New Zealand’s non-refoulement obligations.57 The Tribunal’s decision in
this respect was also confirmed by appellate courts, including the Supreme
Court.58 Mr. Teitiota was deported from New Zealand and sent back to
Kiribati.
3. Mr. Teitiota’s complaint to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee under the ICCPR
Having exhausted domestic remedies in New Zealand, Mr. Teitiota filed
a complaint with the Committee, which is tasked with articulating the
obligations of state parties to the ICCPR in respect of human rights.59
In his complaint, Mr. Teitiota claimed that his forcible deportation
from New Zealand to Kiribati violated his right to life under article 6(1)
of the ICCPR. The constituent elements under article 6(1) can be broken
down into a real or reasonably foreseeable risk to life as a consequence of
removal.60
In considering Mr. Teitiota’s complaint, the Committee affirmed
earlier interpretations of the very well-established right to life under article
6(1), including that:
• it is the supreme right under the Covenant, which must be
interpreted broadly and from which no derogation is permitted61;
• it includes the right of individuals to enjoy a life with dignity62;
and
• it imposes obligations on States where there are reasonably
foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result
in loss of life63;
56. Ibid at para 87.
57. Ibid at paras 88-90.
58. Teitiota NZHC, supra note 42; Teitiota NZCA, supra note 29; Teitiota NZSC, supra note 32.
59. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 302, Can TS 1976 No 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
[Optional Protocol] establishes the Committee’s jurisdiction and competence to “receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation
by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.” The Committee is tasked with
articulating the obligations of state parties to the ICCPR in respect of human rights.
60. Teitiota, supra note 9 at para 9.7.
61. Ibid at paras 2.9, 6.1, 6.2, 9.4.
62. Ibid at para 9.4.
63. Ibid.
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The Committee reviewed the Tribunal decision and found that
notwithstanding article 6(1) of the ICCPR, Mr. Teitiota’s removal from
New Zealand was lawful. The Committee held that Mr. Teitiota had failed
to demonstrate that the risks faced upon being deported to Kiribati reached
the threshold required to violate the right to enjoy life with dignity.64
While the Committee accepted that Kiribati could become submerged in
water as a result of climate change, 65 the evidence before the Committee
estimated that it would take ten to fifteen years for that risk to be realized.
The Committee held that likelihood of harm stemming from Mr Teitiota’s
removal was therefore insufficient to violate the right to life as intervening
events, assistance, and acts could change the course of the climate change
threats that Mr. Teitiota would face in Kiribati.66
However, in coming to this decision, the Committee also took the
landmark step of affirming that states do, in certain circumstances, have
human rights non-refoulement obligations not to deport individuals who
face a real risk of irreparable harm to the right to life or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment under the ICCPR. The Committee held that a State
party to the ICCPR, such as New Zealand, or for our purposes, Canada, is
obligated to take positive measures to protect the right to life under article
6(1), which “extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening
situations that can result in loss of life.”67
The Committee’s decision in Teitiota reaffirmed the fundamental link
between the right to life, human dignity, and the need for environmental
protection, which was first recognized in the Committee’s August 2019
decision in Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay.68 The decision crystalizes “a
deeper and wider body of jurisprudence” on the relationship between the
environment and the right to life.69 Importantly, with respect to climate
change displacement, it not only recognizes the right to life and the right
to life with dignity, but the application of these concepts to states’ nonrefoulement obligations.
The Committee, however, set an extremely high threshold for such
non-refoulement obligations to apply. According to the Committee’s

64. Ibid at para 9.8.
65. Ibid at para 9.12.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid at para 9.4.
68. Human Rights Committee, Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay, UNCCPROR, 126th Sess, UN Doc
CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016 (2019), online (pdf): <documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G19/279/13/PDF/G1927913.pdf?OpenElement> [perma.cc/925B-6TN4].
69. Le Moli, supra note 19 at 749.
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decision in Teitiota, examples of life-threatening situations under article
6(1) included:
• Evidence that the supply of fresh water is inaccessible (not just
difficult to access), insufficient, or unsafe so as to produce a
reasonably foreseeable threat of a health risk impairing the right
to enjoy life with dignity or cause unnatural or premature death;
• Evidence of a real and reasonably foreseeable risk of indigence,
deprivation of food, and extreme precarity that could threaten the
right to life, including to a life with dignity; or
• Imminent or established sea level rise that renders a territory
inhabitable.70
Nonetheless, the decision in Teitiota demonstrates that the principle of
non-refoulement and instruments such as the ICCPR may provide an
avenue to address the gaps in international and domestic frameworks for
those who fall outside of refugee law in this respect.71
Even though the Committee’s decision is not directly binding on
Canada, Canada has ratified the ICCPR. The presumption of conformity—
that the Charter should therefore provide at least as much protection as
is afforded by the ICCPR—is therefore triggered.72 As such, the ICCPR
should be treated as an “interpretive tool” which assists the courts in
“delineating the breadth and scope of Charter rights.”73 The general
application of the ICCPR and the Committee’s decisions in Canadian
domestic law are therefore discussed below.
II. Canada’s obligations under the ICCPR
Canada’s reception of international law is governed by dualism.74 Under
traditional dualist theory, the federal executive enters into international
treaties, but it is only after the legislature incorporates those treaties into
domestic law that they become directly binding in Canada.75 Contemporary
Canadian dualism has, however, evolved significantly from its traditionalist
roots. Since the advent of the Charter, Canadian courts have recognized
that ratified treaties that are not directly incorporated into Canadian law
still play a role in delineating Canada’s human rights obligations through
the presumption of conformity.
70. Teitiota, supra note 9 at paras 9.8-9.12.
71. McAdam “Protecting People Displaced,” supra note 8 at 713.
72. Québec inc, supra note 11 at paras 31-32.
73. Ibid at para 34.
74. Gerald P Heckman, “Securing Procedural Safeguards for Asylum Seekers in Canadian Law: An
Expanding Role for International Human Rights Law” (2003) 15:2 Intl J Refugee L 212 at 231, DOI:
<10.1093/ijrl/15.2.212> [Heckman “Securing Procedural Safeguards”].
75. Ibid at 231.
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In 9147-0732 Québec inc, the Supreme Court held that ratified
international human rights instruments trigger the presumption of
conformity. As the Court stated, the presumption of conformity is a firmly
established interpretive principle that:
‘the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least
as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human
rights documents which Canada has ratified’: p. 349 (emphasis added).
This proposition has since become a firmly established interpretive
principle in Charter interpretation, the presumption of conformity.76

In this vein, the Court also noted that international instruments that predate
the Charter are relevant to consider, in particular where the provisions
contained within such international instruments are conceptually similar
to protections under the Charter.77 This is because in their work the
drafters of the Charter drew on existing international conventions that
were considered “the best models of rights protections.”78
Canada ratified the ICCPR the same year it came into force, in
1976.79 In doing so, it committed to “adopt such laws or measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant” and to ensure any person whose rights are violated has an
effective remedy.80 The Charter came into force in 1982 through the
Constitution Act, 1982.81 When it did, section 7 of the Charter, like article
6(1) of the ICCPR, was established to inter alia protect against arbitrary
deprivations of life that occur as a result of a state’s actions or conduct
in its administration or enforcement of the law.82 Section 7 states that
“everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.”83 The principles of fundamental justice include the
principles against arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality.
76. Québec inc, supra note 11 at para 31 [emphasis in original].
77. Ibid at para 41; Moretto v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 261 at para 74
[Moretto].
78. Québec inc, supra note 11 at para 41.
79. “Reports on United Nations human rights treaties” (last modified 12 July 2022), online:
Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/canada-united-nationssystem/reports-united-nations-treaties.html#a1> [perma.cc/4N7D-L6HS]; “International Human
Rights Treaties to which Canada is a Party” (last modified 5 August 2021), online: Department of
Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/icg-gci/ihrl-didp/tcp.html> [perma.cc/82DPR8GM].
80. ICCPR, supra note 10, art 2.
81. Section 15 of the Charter did, however, come into force three years later in 1985. Charter, supra
note 14, s 15.
82. Teitiota, supra note 9 at para 8.4; Gosselin v Quebec (AG), 2002 SCC 84 at para 77 [Gosselin].
83. Charter, supra note 14, s 7.
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Given the similarity in protections and the fact that Canada ratified the
ICCPR prior to the advent of the Charter, the ICCPR is relevant and
instructive in Charter litigation.84 As the majority in 9147-0732 Québec inc
held, the ICCPR is “binding on Canada, thus triggering the presumption
of conformity.”85
Moreover, Canada is also a party to the Optional Protocol, the complaint
mechanism under the ICCPR. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol establishes
the Committee’s jurisdiction and competence as a quasi-judicial body to
consider complaints from individuals who believe their rights under the
ICCPR have been violated.86 Canadian courts have also accepted that the
Committee’s decisions are of assistance in interpreting the ICCPR.87 As
constitutional scholar Peter Hogg has stated, the Committee’s decisions
are considered particularly relevant to interpreting the scope of protections
under the Charter, both because of Canada’s ratification and because the
Committee’s decisions “are considered interpretations by distinguished
jurists of language and ideas that are similar to the language and ideas of
the Charter.”88
Canada also recognizes the Committee’s authority in respect of
monitoring compliance with the ICCPR, it periodically reports to the
Committee about its implementation of the ICCPR’s treaty obligations,
stating that it meets its ICCPR obligations through the Charter.89 The
Committee’s decisions both under international law and Canadian law
84. Québec inc, supra note 11 at paras 31-39, 41; Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests,
Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54 at para 65.
85. Québec inc, supra note 11 at para 39.
86. Optional Protocol, supra note 59.
87. See e.g. Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47 at paras
26-27 (where the majority relied on the Committee’s General Comment providing guidelines for
interpreting art 12 of the ICCPR). See also Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62
at para 147 [Kazemi]; Revell v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 262 at para 133
[Revell].
88. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2021) (5th ed loose-leaf), ch 36
at 39-43.
89. “International Human Rights Complaints” (last modified 4 March 2022), online: Department
of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/icg-gci/ihrl-didp/com.html> [perma.cc/J3HBUBTN]; Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under
article 40 of the Covenant: Sixth Periodic Reports of States parties due in October 2010: Canada,
UNCCPROR, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/6 (2013), online (pdf): <tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/CAN/6&Lang=en>
[perma.cc/6ML6UMRG]; Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under
article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports of States parties due in October 2010: Canada,
UNCCPROR, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/2004/5 (2004), online (pdf): <tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fCAN%2f2004%2f5&Lang=en>
[perma.cc/5Q83-8PV6] [HRC Fifth Periodic Report]; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “A Hesitant
Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian Courts” (2002) 40 Can YB Intl Law 3 at
30, DOI: <10.1017/S0069005800007992>.
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are, nonetheless, considered guidance rather than precedents to follow in
delineating the scope of the Charter.90 The presumption of conformity is
an “aid to interpretation,” but even a treaty which is highly relevant to the
interpretation of a statute cannot overwhelm legislative intent.91
In Canada and in international law, the idea that human rights nonrefoulement obligations can protect individuals has long been considered
by scholars.92 Canadian case law on the intersection between climate
change and non-refoulement, however, is nascent. Therefore, given the
presumption of conformity, Teitiota may provide helpful context as to
how non-refoulement obligations should develop at the nexus of climate
change, migration, and human rights.
III. The scope of section 7 of the Charter
Section 7 applies to both citizens and noncitizens and includes both
procedural and substantive protections. As the Supreme Court of Canada
established in Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
section 7 applies to “every human being who is physically present in
Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law.”93
Establishing a violation of section 7, whether procedural or substantive, is
a two-stage process. First, a claimant must demonstrate that a law or state
action negatively affects their life, liberty, or security of the person. Second,
the claimant must prove that the deprivation is a violation of the principles
of fundamental justice, including that it is overbroad, disproportionate, or
arbitrary.94
Section 7 is intended to protect against deprivations that occur as a
result of the state’s actions or conduct in its administration or enforcement
of the law.95 When an individual challenges their deportation from Canada,
section 7 is the appropriate right under the Charter to consider. However,
as deportations can touch on several rights, other Charter rights such
as section 12 are also relevant to deportation. Section 12 of the Charter
establishes that “[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment.”96 Notably, the language of section
90. Québec inc, supra note 11 at para 34.
91. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Entertainment Software
Association, 2022 SCC 30 at paras 47-48.
92. McAdam, “Protecting People Displaced,” supra note 8 at 709. Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No 36, UNCCPROR, 124th Sess, Supp No 36, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018)
at para 31, online (pdf): <documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/261/15/PDF/G1926115.
pdf?OpenElement> [perma.cc/3AAC-K6T7].
93. Singh, supra note 15 at 201-202.
94. Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 12 [Charkaoui].
95. Teitiota, supra note 9 at para 8.4; Gosselin, supra note 83 at para 77.
96. Charter, supra note 14, s 12.
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12 of the Charter mirrors that of article 7 of the ICCPR, which establishes
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”97
Procedural protections under section 7 are informed by the common
law principles of procedural fairness, which include the right to be heard
and the right to a fair and impartial adjudication.98 The more significant the
impact of a decision on an individual’s life, liberty, or security of person,
the greater the procedural protections an individual is entitled to.99 In
the immigration context, recent section 7 jurisprudence has also largely
focused on procedural features in a deportation, such as an individual’s
detention during removal proceedings, rather than substantive rights.100
In terms of substantive protections under section 7, the Supreme Court
has indicated that it may violate the principles of fundamental justice to
extradite an individual to a country where they will face criminal charges
that carry the potential of the death penalty101 or to deport an individual to
a jurisdiction where there are substantial grounds to believe they will be
subjected to torture.102 However, the Court has not yet clearly delineated
the extent of such protections. The breadth of substantive protection
remains a longstanding question under section 7. As Justice Binnie writes
extra-judicially, throughout its history the Supreme Court has generally
“been sparing in its invocation of section 7 in respect of what might be
considered ‘substantive’ rights.”103
As a result, in the immigration context, the Federal Court of Appeal has
questioned the extent to which a statutory right to protection is necessary
for an asylum seeker to access substantive rights to security of the person
under section 7.104 This perspective—tying the substantive protections
under the Charter right to a statutory right—is a potential barrier to
climate change asylum seekers who currently do not have statutory rights
in Canada.105 But, as deftly addressed by scholar Gerald Heckman, support
for an approach in which statutory rights may act as a gatekeeper to section
7 is not borne out in the case law.106
97. ICCPR, supra note 10, art 7.
98. Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 at para 113 [Suresh].
99. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 133.
100. Charkaoui, supra note 94 at paras 16-17.
101. United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7 at paras 84-89, 132, 143 [Burns].
102. Suresh, supra note 998 at para 56.
103. The Honourable Ian Binnie, “Judging the Judges: ‘May They Boldly Go Where Ivan Rand Went
Before’” (2013) 26:1 Can JL & Jur 5 at 15, DOI: <10.1017/S0841820900005932>.
104. Savunthararasa v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FCA
51 at paras 27-29.
105. Ibid at para 28.
106. Gerald Heckman, “Revisiting the Application of Section 7 of the Charter in Immigration and
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As stated by Heckman: “Notably absent in Suresh is the notion that a
deprivation of security of the person is contingent on the deprivation of a
right conferred in relevant legislation. Indeed, Suresh had no unqualified
statutory right not to be returned to a country where his life or freedom
would be threatened.”107 Thus, proceeding on this view of the case law, it
is argued that individuals seeking protection on the basis of climate change
impacts do not need to point to any statutory provisions to engage section
7 in the context of deportation.
It is important to note, however, that while Canadian courts generally
apply section 7 of the Charter in a broad and purposive manner, in the
refugee, immigration, and non-status persons’ context, courts have taken
a narrow application of this right. In Chiarelli, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that “[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law is
that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the
country.”108 As a result, a noncitizen’s deportation does not, in and of itself,
implicate the liberty and security interests under section 7 of the Charter.109
As the Federal Court of Appeal held in Revell v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), “the Supreme Court has consistently held that the mere fact
of removing an individual to his or her country of origin is not sufficient to
breach the right to life, liberty or security of that person.”110
This does not mean that deportation proceedings are immune from
section 7 scrutiny.111 While section 7 is not infringed by deportation per se,
without more, it may still be engaged where there are sufficiently serious
consequences to the person. By way of example, the Supreme Court has
noted that the prospect of an individual’s deportation to torture may engage
section 7.112
Temporally, section 7 of the Charter is also not engaged at the stage
in the refugee protection process when an individual is found to be
inadmissible from refugee protection. This is because an inadmissibility
decision does not automatically or immediately result in deportation.113

Refugee Protection” (2017) 68 UNBLJ 312 at 343-344, online: <journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/unblj/
article/view/29065> [perma.cc/556N-8M4B].
107. Ibid at 344.
108. Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 SCR 711 at 733, 90
DLR (4th) 289 at 733-734 [Chiarelli].
109. Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada), 2005 SCC 51 at para
46 [Medovarski]; Kreishan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 223 at para 77.
110. Revell, supra note 887 at para 37.
111. Charkaoui, supra note 94 at paras 16-17.
112. Ibid.
113. Moretto, supra note 77 at para 43.
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Instead, an individual’s section 7 rights are typically engaged at the preremoval risk assessment stage of the process as set out by IRPA.114
When removal order is enforced by a Canada Border Services Agency
(CBSA) officer pursuant to section 48 of IRPA, an individual may also
judicially review a CBSA officer’s decision not to defer a removal. Upon
judicial review, Justice Yves de Montigny of the Federal Court of Appeal
explained that “the Federal Court is empowered to (and in my view must)
assess any risk of harm that has been overlooked by the enforcement
officer in order to determine whether the rights protected by section 7 of
the Charter are engaged.”115
As such, despite the Court’s narrow approach to section 7 in the
immigration context, it is argued that section 7 may still be engaged where
the consequences of an individual’s deportation go beyond the “typical”
consequences of removal and engage their section 7 life, liberty or security
interests.116 The component parts of section 7 are therefore discussed
below.
1. Life, liberty and security of the person
The jurisprudence establishes that the right to life is engaged where state
action directly or indirectly increases one’s risk of death, or imposes
death.117 For example, the right to life is engaged in cases where there has
been a lack of timely access to health care,118 extradition cases where an
individual faces offences punishable by the death penalty if returned,119 as
well as deportation cases where there are grounds to believe an individual
will face substantial risk of torture upon their deportation.120
The quintessential understanding of the right to liberty under section
7 is that the liberty interest is engaged where there is the possibility of
imprisonment.121 The liberty interest under section 7 therefore protects a
person’s fundamental choices, including as the Supreme Court has stated,
“the individual’s right to make inherently private choices and that choosing
where to establish one’s home is one such inherently personal choice.”122
114. Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 at para 67; B010 v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at para 75.
115. Revell, supra note 887 at para 51.
116. Charkaoui, supra note 94 at paras 16-17; Revell, supra note 87 at para 63.
117. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 62 [Carter].
118. Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, at paras 38, 50.
119. Burns, supra note 101 at paras 59-60; Schmidt v The Queen, [1987] 1 SCR 500 at 521, 61 OR
(2d) 530.
120. Suresh, supra note 98 at para 129.
121. Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 515, 24 DLR (4th) 536; R v Vaillancourt, [1987]
2 SCR 636 at para 27, 47 DLR (4th) 399; Charkaoui, supra note 94 at paras 12-13, 18.
122. Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 51; B(R) v
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As such, a decision to deport an individual back to a country where the
impact of climate change affects personal autonomy or inherently private
choices, as Mr. Teitiota claimed, could, in certain circumstances, engage
the liberty interest under section 7.
In Singh, the Supreme Court held that security of the person includes
the “freedom from the threat of physical punishment or suffering as well
as freedom from such punishment itself.”123 State action that causes a risk
to health or life may engage the security of the person.124 Security of the
person may therefore be engaged where the state deports an individual
to a country where they are unable to access water, or face a real and
reasonably foreseeable risk of indigence, deprivation of food, or extreme
precarity.
In certain circumstances, it is clear that climate change or natural
disasters may increase one’s risk to life, liberty, or security of the
person. Although the Supreme Court has yet to answer directly whether
environmental harm violates the Charter, the Court has recognized the
close link between the environment and human health.125 The Court
has also recognized repeatedly that protection of the environment is a
“fundamental value in Canadian society” and one that plays a “public
purpose of superordinate importance.”126 Similarly, in respect to climate
change and its seriousness, the Supreme Court has characterized climate
change as “an existential challenge,” “a threat of the highest order to
the country, and indeed to the world,” underlying that “[t]he undisputed
existence of a threat to the future of humanity cannot be ignored.”127
Further, the extent to which the Constitution, including the Charter,
can protect against the negative effects of climate change is an open and
important question in Canadian public and environmental law. Recently,
in Mathur v Ontario, applicants launched climate litigation in the form of
judicial review seeking declaratory and mandatory orders on the basis that
the Ontario government’s plans to address GHG emissions and climate
change are insufficiently ambitious. As such, the applicants argued the
plans will negatively impact the health, lives, liberty, and livelihood of
current and future generations of Ontarians, thereby violating their section
Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 21 OR (3d) 479.
123. Singh, supra note 15 at 207.
124. Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44 at para 93.
125. R v Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 SCR 213 at paras 132, 151 DLR (4th) 32.
126. Ibid at paras 85, 124, 151; Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 SCR 1031 at para 55, 125
DLR (4th) 385; Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR
3 at 16, 88 DLR (4th) 1; 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001
SCC 40 at para 1; British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at para 7.
127. Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 at para 167.
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7 and 15 Charter rights.128 In dismissing a motion to strike the claim,
Justice Carole J Brown, held that “[o]n its face, the Application engages
each of the s. 7 rights: life, liberty, and security.”129
More generally, although liberty and security of the person, as stated
above, are not engaged by deportation per se, the Supreme Court has
left open the question of whether deportation may in certain cases be
considered cruel and unusual treatment that falls within the meaning of
section 12 of the Charter.130
For example, it is conceivable that in certain circumstances
environmental and humanitarian conditions in the receiving state may be
such that deportation to the country of origin could constitute cruel and
unusual treatment. As Charter provisions must be read together as the
individual elements of the Constitution are linked both to each other and
the whole,131 understandings of cruel and unusual punishment under section
12 could inform any analysis of the consequences of a person’s removal
under section 7 and whether these go beyond the “typical” consequences
of removal.132 In Revell, without deciding the issue, the Federal Court of
Appeal held that “treatment” within the meaning of section 12 is likely
broad enough to include deportation.133
Taking these aspects of section 7 and the protection against cruel and
unusual punishment under section 12 into consideration, the Supreme
Court could, and should, explicitly consider environmental conditions,
including the impact of climate change, natural disasters, and the
cumulative effects of environmental risks on individuals when assessing
whether their deportation could violate an individual’s liberty interest or
security of the person.
2. The principles of fundamental justice
Once a claimant has demonstrated that their right to life, liberty, or security
of the person has been violated, they must demonstrate that the state has
done so in a manner that violates the principles of fundamental justice. The
principles of fundamental justice “set out the minimum requirements that
a law that negatively impacts on a person’s life, liberty, or security of the
person must meet.”134 As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh,
128. Mathur v Ontario, 2020 ONSC 6918 at para 142, leave to appeal to ONSC refused, Mathur v
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 1624.
129. Ibid at para 147.
130. Chiarelli, supra note 108 at 735.
131. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 50, 161 DLR (4th) 385.
132. Burns, supra note 101 at para 57; Revell, supra note 88 at para 63.
133. Revell, supra note 87 at para 125.
134. Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para 94 [Bedford].
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“[t]he inquiry into the principles of fundamental justice is informed not
only by Canadian experience and jurisprudence, but also by international
law, including jus cogens.”135 A law or state action is understood to violate
the principles of fundamental justice when it is arbitrary or infringes upon
a right in an overbroad or grossly disproportionate manner.136
In fact, in Suresh, the Court went on to state that consideration of the
international perspective in the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter
in the immigration context is imperative:
[T]he principles of fundamental justice expressed in s. 7 of the Charter
and the limits on rights that may be justified under s. 1 of the Charter
cannot be considered in isolation from the international norms which
they reflect. A complete understanding of the [Immigration] Act and the
Charter requires consideration of the international perspective.137

In this vein, international treaties, in particular those which are ratified
by Canada, act as interpretive aids for courts “both as a contextual tool
and for providing support or confirmation for the result of a purposeful
interpretation of the Constitution.”138 As the Supreme Court of Canada
stated in Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran:
When a party points to a provision in an international treaty as evidence
of a principle of fundamental justice, a court must determine (a) whether
there is significant international consensus regarding the interpretation
of the treaty, and (b) whether there is consensus that the particular
interpretation is fundamental to the way in which the international legal
system ought to fairly operate (Malmo-Levine, at para. 113; Suresh, at
para. 46).139

In fact, both section 7 and section 12 contain an internal balancing and
proportionality between mental and physical harm of the individual and
the countervailing social aspects at play.140 In the context of migration,
there has always been a tension between the moral imperative to protect
135. Suresh, supra note 98 at para 46.
136. Carter, supra note 117 at para 72.
137. Suresh, supra note 98 at para 59.
138. Interlake Reserves Tribal Council Inc et al v The Government of Manitoba, 2020 MBCA 126 at
para 37.
139. Kazemi, supra note 87 at para 147.
140. Lloyd v Attorney General of Canada, 2021 ABQB 204 at paras 71-73 [Lloyd] (“[s]ection 7
expressly permits the state to impose risks of physical and mental harm when doing so is in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice: [Carter, supra note 118 at paras 64, 71-72]… Section 12
also contains an internal aspect of proportionality: R v Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39 at para 26. As Sopinka
J discussed in [Chiarelli, supra note 109 at 736], this requires a consideration of the countervailing
societal interests at play when determining whether the impugned treatment is cruel or unusual” at
paras 72-73).
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individuals in need of protection and human dignity and the demands of
state sovereignty.141
Sections 7 and 12 do not protect against ordinary stresses, anxieties, or
physical and psychological harm caused by government action, which is
proportionate to the reasons for its imposition.142 Nonetheless, it is certainly
foreseeable that harm that causes forced climate migration could reach the
threshold of risk such that deportation would engage Charter scrutiny, and
in some cases protection and non-refoulement obligations as articulated in
Teitiota. For example, deporting an individual to a country of origin where
there is severe vulnerability to life-threatening environmental conditions,
violence, uninhabitable land or no access to food or water could “shock the
conscience” of the Canadian public so as to make the decision to deport
one that breaches the principles of fundamental justice.143
3. Causation
To demonstrate a violation of the principles of fundamental justice,
applicants must prove a “sufficient causal connection” between the risks
faced and the impugned law or state action.144 The Court has held that
“the guarantee of fundamental justice applies even to deprivations of life,
liberty or security effected by actors other than our government, if there is
a sufficient causal connection between our government’s participation and
the deprivation ultimately effected.”145
Further, a “sufficient causal connection” is to be understood in the
specific circumstances of a claim.146 Generally, in the environmental
sphere, demonstrating a “sufficient causal connection” between a specific
environmental harm and a clear risk to human health has been a stumbling
block for Charter litigation.147 Proving causation may also prove difficult
for those seeking protection on the basis of climate change or natural
disasters due to the multi-causal nature of such forced displacement.
Similar to Teitiota, the Charter jurisprudence also places limits on
the right to life protection so as to distinguish between risks that are
reasonably foreseeable and those that are too “uncertain, speculative and
141. Toby DJ Mendel, “Problems with the International Definition of a Refugee and a Possible
Solution” (1992) 1 Dal J Leg Stud 7 at 10, online: <digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls/vol1/
iss1/1/> [perma.cc/V8H9-B2HU].
142. Lloyd, supra note 140 at para 74; Dixon v Director, Ministry of the Environment, 2014 ONSC
7404 at para 61.
143. Suresh, supra note 98 at paras 56-57.
144. Bedford, supra note 134 at para 75; Suresh, supra note 99 at para 54.
145. Suresh, supra note 99 at para 54.
146. Bedford, supra note 134 at para 75.
147. Nathalie J Chalifour “Environmental Justice and the Charter: Do Environmental Injustices
Infringe Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter?” (2015) 28:1 J Envtl L & Prac 89 at 123.
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hypothetical.”148 Ultimately, the causation element under the section 7
analysis turns on the evidence a claimant is able to provide.
Whether deportation in such cases would violate the principles of
fundamental justice and pass the causation test will depend on the specific
circumstances and evidence. Canadian courts will almost certainly be
concerned about the effects of broadening protections for climate and
disaster-displaced individuals and about critiques of judicial activism
when faced with interpreting the Committee’s decision and section 7 in
the context of climate change migration. As with the Committee’s decision
in Teitiota, if a claim is to succeed in Canada, courts will likely place
a high threshold for the category of risk required to avoid deportation,
including the inability of individuals to avail themselves of their own
state’s protection or the steps that a state is taking to mitigate or adapt to
climate change.149
Finally, as noted above, the Committee’s decision indicates that risk
to life in violation of article 6(1) cannot derive from the general conditions
in the receiving state, except in the more extreme cases.150 At present, it is
unlikely that general situations of climate disasters such as forest fires or
widespread flooding will be sufficient. Rather, in most circumstances in
order for the protection under article 6 to apply, an individual must be in a
particularly vulnerable situation, or the disaster must be so extreme that an
individual would be exposed simply by returning.151
For these reasons and with the limits discussed above, in particular the
focus on the consequences of removal as compared to inadmissibility, the
principles already articulated under section 7, as supported and confirmed
by the Committee’s decision, provide a foundation to protect those who
would face a real risk of irreparable harm to life, liberty, or security of
the person if they return to their home country. In such cases, many of the
concerns that animated Mr. Teitiota’s own claim would likely animate a
similar claim under section 7 of the Charter.
Given the gaps in Canada’s current legislative framework it is, however,
important to acknowledge that judicial action can at best identify deficits
in the current regime. The entrenchment of the Charter positioned the
court as the independent arbiter between state action and an individual’s
148. Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at 447, 18 DLR (4th) 481.
149. Ward, supra note 45 at 725-726 (which stands for the proposition that a state is presumed to be
capable of protecting its citizens, barring a complete breakdown of the state apparatus. To rebut the
presumption of state protection, clear and convincing evidence of a state’s inability to protect must be
provided).
150. Teitiota, supra note 9 at para 9.3.
151. Ibid at para 9.12.
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rights where government action or inaction infringes on section 7. But
once deficits are identified, it is the legislature that must act to develop
and propose solutions. As such, legislative action remains a necessary
priority. The following section will therefore identify areas where Canada
can begin to revise and implement measures and mechanisms to prepare
for and address forced displacement in the climate change context.
IV. Priority areas for legislative action
To date, Canada has not systematically applied a human rights lens to
domestic or international climate migration. But as discussed at the
outset, climate change, migration, and human rights are all linked.152
The federal government already recognizes this. Canada is a signatory to
several international agreements that have begun to consider migration
and displacement in the context of climate change.153 Canada has also
taken a leadership role on the Steering Committee for the Platform on
Disaster Displacement, which seeks to implement the recommendations of
the 2015 Protection Agenda launched by Switzerland and Norway.154 The
Protection Agenda is a nonbinding, international document that identifies
practical solutions and existing state practices that address the impacts of
climate change and natural disasters on forced cross-border migration.155
While Canada did not endorse the Protection Agenda during initial
intergovernmental consultation, it subsequently endorsed the Platform

152. Erin Daly & James R May, “Environmental Dignity Rights” (2017) Widener University
Delaware Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 17-02 1 at 6, online: SSRN <papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885500> [perma.cc/VPY4-AA46].
153. UNISDR, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, 18 March 2015,
(Sendai: UNISDR, 2015), paras 7, 27(h), 36(a)(vi), online (pdf): <www.unisdr.org/files/43291_
sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf> [perma.cc/N2TR-4FB6]; Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development, GA Res 70A/1, UNGAOR, 70th Sess, UN Doc A/Res/70/1 (2015),
online
(pdf):
<www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/
globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf> [perma.cc/PP85-YFSG]; Paris Agreement to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 12 December 2015, 16 TIAS 1104 (entered into force
4 November 2016), Preamble, online (pdf): <unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.
pdf> [perma.cc/VGS5-KKKN].
154. See McAdam, “Shaping International Approaches,” supra note 49 at 1521-1522, 1524, 1532.
As Jane McAdam writes, at a ministerial meeting commemorating the 60th anniversary of the 1951
Refugee Convention in 2011 five states, Norway, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Germany, and Mexico
endorsed a pledge to engage in dialogue about how to prepare for climate change directive. The pledge
resulted in the creation of the Nansen Initiative and the resulting Agenda for the Protection of CrossBorder Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Nansen Initiative, supra
note 2), which outlines gaps in the framework for addressing disaster and climate change migration
and has since been endorsed by 109 states. The Nansen Initiative was succeeded by the Platform on
Disaster Displacement in 2016, which works to implement the approach outlined by the Protection
Agenda.
155. Nansen Initiative, supra note 2.
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for Disaster Risk Reduction, which seeks to implement the Protection
Agenda’s recommendations.156
Canada was also a leader in the development of the 2018 Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which addresses
climate change as a driver of forced migration.157 Under objective 5 of the
GCM, Canada and other signatories committed themselves to developing
mechanisms to address forced migration due to sudden-onset natural
disasters and other precarious situations in ways that include “providing
humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, access to education for children,
and temporary work permits, while adaptation in or return to their country
of origin is not possible.”158
Under objective 21 of GCM, Canada also committed “to guarantee
due process, individual assessment and effective remedy, by upholding the
prohibition of collective expulsion and of returning migrants when there
is a real and foreseeable risk of death, torture and other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment, or other irreparable harm, in
accordance with our obligations under international human rights law.”159
This commitment clearly recognizes Canada’s obligations under article
6(1) of the ICCPR. As discussed above, Teitiota makes it clear that the
Committee recognizes states’ obligations under the ICCPR not to deport
in certain circumstances where the impacts of climate change pose a risk
to life.
Further, in June 2020 Canada accepted the International Organization
for Migration’s (IOM) invitation to become a “Champion” country for the
GCM. In its acceptance letter to the IOM, Canada stated that it viewed
becoming a Champion country as “an opportunity to further promote its
156. McAdam, “Shaping International Approaches,” supra note 49 at 1542; “The Nansen Initiative
Global Consultation: Conference Report: Geneva, 12-13 Oct 2015” (December 2015) at 61, online
(pdf): Platform on Disaster Displacement <disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/
Delegations-supporting-the-Protection-Agenda-1.pdf> [perma.cc/XC9E-BFRP].
157. James Milner, “Canada and the UN Global Compact on Refugees: A Case Study of Influence
in the Global Refugee Regime” in Samy Yiagadeesen & Duncan Howard, eds, International Affairs
and Canadian Migration Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) 41; Jenna Hennebry, “Bringing
the migration compact home,” Open Canada (1 March 2019), online: <opencanada.org/bringingmigration-compact-home/> [perma.cc/BNJ4-8UBT].
158. Human Rights Council, Resolution of the Protection of the Human Rights of Migrants: The
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, GA Res 35/17, UNHRCOR, 35th Sess,
UN Doc A/HRC/RES/35/17 (2017), online (pdf): <www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/
migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_HRC_RES_35_17.pdf>
[perma.cc/9MMYCZKN]; Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, GA Res 73/195, UNGAOR, 73rd
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/73/195 (2019) at objective 5, para 21(g), online (pdf): <migrationnetwork.
un.org/resources/ares73195-global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration> [perma.cc/A96UUEX8] [UN, “GA Res 73/195”].
159. UN, “GA Res 73/195,” supra note 159 at objective 21, para 37.
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existing areas of leadership in international migration management, and
to influence other States to adopt best practices in priority areas that are
aligned with the GCM.”160 The climate change migration nexus can, and
should, be one of these priority areas.161
Not only is such migration already occurring, but Canada has an
ethical responsibility to address the impacts of a climate crisis to which
it has contributed. In 2018, Canada was ranked as the tenth largest GHG
emitter in the world.162 Climate injustice in respect to those who bear the
brunt of the crisis and those who have caused it is stark. Together the 15
highest emitting nations produce 72.21% of global GHG emissions.163 By
contrast, together the 14 Pacific Island nations, which include Kiribati,
produce only 0.23%.164
Given Canada’s responsibility to address the climate crisis it helped
create and the commitments, both binding and non-binding, it has made,
proposals for how Canada may address climate migration is necessary.
At present, there are no explicit provisions in Canadian immigration and
refugee law under which individuals forcibly displaced by climate change
or disasters comfortably fit. Canada’s response remains, at best, ad hoc.
Section 3(3)(f) of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(IRPA) states that the Act must be “construed and applied in a manner that
…complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada
is a signatory.”165 This provision was “heralded as an important advance in
Canadian immigration law” with respect to Canada’s international human
rights obligations.166 In preparation for its implementation, Canada’s
Immigration and Refugee Board (the IRB) anticipated a greater focus
on international human rights law and worked to train decision makers
160. Letter from Leslie E Norton, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN, to
António Vitorino, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (4 June 2020),
online: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations and the World Trade Organization
<migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/default/files/docs/canada_confirmation-champion-gcm.pdf> [perma.
cc/4RU5-FL35].
161. “The Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers’ 2021 Report on Climate Migrants” (2021)
at 5, online (pdf): Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (CARL) <carl-acaadr.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2021/11/CARL-Climate-Migration-Report-FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/5R7D-4LP7].
162. “Global greenhouse gas emissions” (last modified 26 May 2022), online: Environment and
Climate Change Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmentalindicators/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions.html> [perma.cc/Y9XU-K68U].
163. Nikola Čašule & Genevieve Jiva, “Te Mana o te Moana: The State of the Climate in the Pacific
Report 2021” (2021) at 7, online (pdf): Greenpeace <acthubspot.greenpeace.org.au/pacific-climatereport> [perma.cc/DRG6-2BDM].
164. Ibid.
165. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 3(3)(f) [IRPA].
166. Catherine Dauvergne, “International Human Rights in Canadian Immigration Law: The Case of
the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada” (2012) 19:1 Ind J Global Leg Stud 305 at 311-312,
DOI: <10.2979/indjglolegstu.19.1.305> [Dauvergne, “International Human Rights”].
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accordingly.167 In the first years following IRPA’s coming into force,
decision makers did in fact make frequent references to international texts
and standards and. according to the data, discussion of international law
correlated to positive outcomes for individuals.168
As time went on, however, reliance on international law decreased
significantly. As scholar Catherine Dauvergne writes in a study analyzing
the use of international human rights in IRB decision-making, one factor
in this decline may have been the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in
De Guzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (De
Guzman). In that case, the Federal Court of Appeal held that section
3(3)(f) could not be used to invalidate specific provisions of IRPA, as
international human rights instruments should not be interpreted to prevail
over domestic law. Further, the Court held that section 3(3)(f) does not
require that each provision of IRPA individually comply with international
human rights law. Rather, it is only the Act considered as a whole that must
be considered compliant with Canada’s human rights obligations.169
Since De Guzman, IRPA has generally been held to comply with
international law by virtue of section 25, which allows individuals to
apply for protection on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.170
Notwithstanding section 25, there are concerns about the ability of
noncitizens in Canada to actually access and enforce their human rights
under international instruments such as the ICCPR.171 Studies show a
concerning lack of references to human rights treaties in Immigration
and Refugee Board decisions as well as lower engagement by decision
makers with such norms in more recent years.172 This drop in engagement
is particularly concerning given the Supreme Court jurisprudence that
demonstrates that it is both highly relevant and proper to consider such
instruments.173 The following legislative and policy recommendations
167. Ibid at 312.
168. Ibid at 316.
169. De Guzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (FCA), 2005 FCA 436 at para
81.
170. France Houle & Noura Karazivan, “Application of Non-Implemented International Law by the
Federal Court of Appeal: Towards a Symbolic Effect of s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA” (2009) 32:2 Dal LJ
221 at 245, 242, online: <digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj/vol32/iss2/1/> [perma.cc/CW4GRGAY].
171. Idil Atak & Lorielle Giffin, “Canada’s Treatment of Non-Citizens Through the Lens of the
United Nations Individual Complaints Mechanisms” (2019) 56 Can YB Int Law 292 at 294, DOI:
<10.1017/cyl.2019.13>; Dauvergne, supra note 166 at 322-323; Stephen Meili, “When Do Human
Rights Treaties Help Asylum Seekers? A Study of Theory and Practice in Canadian Jurisprudence
Since 1990” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 627 at 629, online: <digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
ohlj/vol51/iss2/7/> [perma.cc/JWB3-B6DB].
172. Dauvergne, supra note 166 at 317; Meili, supra note 172 at 647-648.
173. Québec inc, supra note 11 at paras 30-32.
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provide a variety of options for the government to implement a human
rights framework for climate migration. These recommendations build
on the policy options proposed by the Canadian Association of Refugee
Lawyers (CARL) in its 2021 Report on Climate Migration.174
1. Section 97 of IRPA
In respect of the right to life, Canada has reported to the ICCPR that
article 6(1), “[r]isk to life constitutes an express ground for protection
in IRPA (section 97).”175 Section 97 establishes that “persons in need of
protection” will be afforded protection in Canada. A person in need of
protection under section 97(1)(b)(ii) must face a risk not faced generally
by other individuals in or from their country. This is because the provision
is associated with risks of “crime, violence, extortion, corruption, abuse
of authority, human rights violations, general insecurity, terrorism, suicide
bombing, political extremism and activities of armed groups” that may fall
outside the Convention.176
The personalized risk requirement, however, effectively excludes those
seeking protection on the basis of climate change or disaster displacement.
To ensure IRPA is being applied in a manner consistent with the ICCPR
and is broad enough to protect those fleeing the effects of climate change or
natural disaster, Parliament could amend section 97 to add subsection 97(1)
(c), which would “[carve] out a legislated exception to the requirement of
‘personalized risk’ for climate migrants specifically.”177
Parliament could develop criteria to assist IRB decision makers in
identifying individuals who should be understood to be protected persons
under an expanded section 97(1)(c). At present, IRB decision makers use
international human rights standards to determine whether a person’s
fear of persecution brings them under the definition of a Convention
Refugee.178 Officers should also look at human rights standards in the
climate-migration context to assess an individual’s risk to life, liberty, or
security of the person.
As a guide, the Protection Agenda proposes criteria for determining
whether persons may require protection because they are seriously and
personally affected by disaster or climate change. For example, the
Protection Agenda suggests that a person may need protection when
174. CARL, supra note 162.
175. HRC Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 90 at para 33.
176. Rodriguez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 11 at para 16.
177. CARL, supra note 161 at 11; IRPA, supra note 166, s 97.
178. François Crépeau, Delphine Nakache & Idil Atak, “International Migration: Security
Concerns and Human Rights Standards” (2007) 44:3 Transcultural Psychiatry 311 at 315, DOI:
<10.1177/1363461507081634>.
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“[a]n on-going or, in rare cases, an imminent and foreseeable disaster
in the country of origin poses a real risk to his/her life or safety” and
protection and assistance are not available due to the fact that government
capacity to respond is temporarily overwhelmed, or access to assistance,
whether governmental or humanitarian, is not possible because of factual
or legal obstacles.179 In assessing these factors, a cumulative approach
to harm, which addresses objective factors and individuals’ preexisting
vulnerabilities and particular characteristics, should be preferred by the
IRB.
As mentioned at the outset, while climate change may be linked to
migration, very few cases of migration are caused by environmental
factors alone. An individual’s particular circumstance can often define
the particular risks faced. As the Protection Agenda notes: “for example,
sick and wounded persons, children, particularly when orphaned or
unaccompanied, women headed households, people with disabilities,
older persons and members of indigenous peoples are often among the
most seriously affected survivors of disasters.”180 In this respect, the IRB
already publishes Chairperson’s Guidelines, which are nonbinding tools to
assist decision makers in immigration and refugee matters.
These guidelines are intended only to inform interpretation of IRPA
and provide guidance for adjudicating and managing cases. They are not a
means to amend or revise the current immigration framework. However, if
section 97 were amended along similar lines discussed in this article, such
guidelines could be supplemented in the above respects to address climate/
environment-induced forced migration that falls under the ICCPR.
2. Humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) requests
Beyond section 97 of IRPA, individuals seeking protection from climate
change may also apply under section 25(1) of IRPA for status to remain
on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds.181 But applying for
H&C protection for those who migrate because of climate change is no
straightforward matter. Historically, H&C applications are discretionary
and have been awarded only in exceptional cases where an individual
demonstrates hardship and established ties to Canada.182 Therefore,
while it is possible for climate-displaced individuals to seek protection
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, H&C requests should not
179. Nansen Initiative, supra note 2 at 22.
180. Ibid.
181. IRPA, supra note 165, s 25(1).
182. Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 at paras 12-14, 21-27
[Kanthasamy].
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in and of themselves be considered an alternative pathway to status and
protection in Canada for those forcibly displaced by the impacts of climate
change or natural disasters.
For an H&C request to be granted, officers who review humanitarian
and compassionate applications must consider, and individual applicants
must demonstrate, “unusual and undeserved” or “disproportionate”
hardship.183 However, the Supreme Court in Kanthasamy was clear that
these words should not create a new threshold for relief and do not remove
the obligation of officers to consider and give weight to all relevant H&C
considerations in a particular case.184
The current Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
operational bulletin provides that the factors relevant to H&C Requests
include, but are not limited to, an applicant’s:
• ties to Canada;
• best interests of any children affected by an individual’s
application. Further, Canada is also a signatory to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which stresses the centrality of the best
interests of a child185;
• health considerations;
• family violence considerations;
• factors in the country of origin;
• inability to leave Canada which has led to establishment; and
• any unique or exceptional circumstances that merit relief.186
Environmental conditions in an individual’s country of origin are
not regularly considered. At present, IRCC officers are not required to
specifically refer to or analyze international human rights instruments
183. Ibid at paras 26, 55; “Humanitarian and compassionate assessment: Hardship and the H&C
assessment” (last modified 2 March 2016), online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operationalbulletins-manuals/permanent-residence/humanitarian-compassionate-consideration/processing/
assessment-hardship-assessment.html> [perma.cc/G5MN-JEQH].
184. Kanthasamy, supra note 182 at para 33.
185. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS (entered into force on 2
September 1990, ratification by Canada 12 December 1991).
186. “Guide 5291: Humanitarian and Compassionate Considerations” (last modified 2 March 2016),
online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/permanent-residence/
humanitarian-compassionate-consideration/processing/assessment-hardship-assessment.html>
[perma.cc/JV9L-PYPS]. See also “Guide 5599: Humanitarian and Compassionate Considerations
under the February 4, 2016 Temporary Public Policy for nationals of Haiti and Zimbabwe” (last
modified 10 February 2020), online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.canada.
ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/guide-5599humanitarian-compassionate-considerations-february-4-2016-temporary-public-policy-nationalshaiti-zimbabwe.html> [perma.cc/8UEM-YT7M].
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such as the ICCPR. Further, notwithstanding section 3(3)(f), the Federal
Court has held that the values enshrined in the ICCPR must only inform
an IRCC officer’s decision.187 There is therefore no guarantee that IRCC
decision makers will turn their minds to the evolving nature of individuals’
rights in the context of forced climate migration and the right to life. The
discretionary and opaque nature of H&C decision-making is illustrated
most recently by statistics that show that H&C rejections doubled in 2020
during the COVID pandemic, but without any announced change in policy
and despite immigration levels falling significantly during this period.188
As such, to acknowledge and address the impacts of climate change on
migration, these guidelines could, for example, be supplemented to include
environmental conditions, including climate and natural disasters, in an
individual’s country of origin.189 In this vein, the Canadian Association of
Refugee Lawyers has proposed adding the following factors to the IRCC’s
guidelines and requiring officers to turn their minds to climate-related
migration:
short-term or long-term environmental disasters or degradation—
including typhoons, hurricanes, wildfires, tsunamis, desertification,
deforestation, rising temperatures, and rising sea levels, among others—
that can be expected to pose a risk to a person’s life, liberty, or security
of the person during the course of their lifetime, because of its direct
physical effects and/or because of secondary socio-political effects such
as population pressures, profound poverty, and political strife.190

3. Temporary stay of removals and residency
In addition to H&C considerations, individuals may be able to avail
themselves of protection through a temporary stay of removals (TSR). If
an individual remains in Canada without legal status, a removal order from
Canada will normally be issued by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada, which is enforced by the Canadian Border Services Agency.191
However, under section 53(d) of IRPA, the minister of immigration, refugees
and citizenship has the power to stay removal orders and deportation by
declaring a TSR for a country or place.192 Unlike the individualized risk
considered in the course of an H&C application, a TSR will be imposed
187. Okoloubu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 326 at para 50.
188. Syed Hussan “Canada rejected double the number of humanitarian applications for immigration
in 2020” (13 July 2021), online: Migrant Rights Network <migrantrights.ca/hc202rejections/> [perma.
cc/G5TY-QUU6].
189. CARL, supra note 161 at 11.
190. Ibid.
191. IRPA, supra note 165 at s 48.
192. Ibid, s 53(d).
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where the minister considers that there is a generalized risk that renders
return to a specific country dangerous and unsafe to the entire general
civilian population of that country or place.193 The minister may issue a
TSR on environmental grounds if there is “a generalized risk to the entire
civilian population as a result of…an environmental disaster resulting in
substantial temporary disruption of living conditions.”194 As such, TSRs
may be a powerful tool to provide protection to those forcibly displaced
by the impact of climate change and natural disasters.
For example, in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which
reached a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale and created catastrophic
devastation across Haiti, the minister announced a moratorium on
removals to Haiti. Approximately 300,000 people were killed, hundreds
of thousands more were injured, and around 1 million people were left
homeless in the wake of the earthquake.195 The earthquake also severely
reduced the capacity of the Haitian state and led to severe food insecurity,
malnutrition, the worst cholera outbreak in recent history, and increased
levels of violence, which prompted Ottawa to provide temporary protection
to Haitian nationals in Canada by staying any removal.196
In addition to issuing a TSR after the earthquake, Canada also prioritized
visa applications from Haitian nationals and reduced obstacles to applying
for permits by waiving additional fees for workers and students to extend
their stay in Canada.197 The TSR remained in place until 1 December
2014.198 When the TSR ended, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada estimated that approximately 3,200 Haitians faced removal.199
The minister of citizenship and immigration, however, issued a temporary
193. “ENF 10 Removals” (24 February 2017), online (pdf): Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf10-eng.
pdf> [perma.cc/PB6F-HVZM].
194. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 230(1)(b) [IRPR].
195. Benedetta Faedi Duramy, “Women in the Aftermath of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake” (2011)
25:3 Emory Intl L Rev 1193 at 1193-1194, online: <scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol25/
iss3/6/> [perma.cc/GJP6-HFMU].
196. Ibid at 1197-1203; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, “Government of
Canada introduces special immigration measures in response to the earthquake in Haiti” (16 January
2010), online: <www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2010/01/government-canada-introduces-specialimmigration-measures-response-earthquake-haiti.html> [perma.cc/V2WP-473N].
197. Anna Mehler Paperny, “Canada to give immigration priority to Haiti earthquake survivors,”
The Globe and Mail (16 January 2010), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-togive-immigration-priority-to-haiti-earthquake-survivors/article4187524/> [perma.cc/K57D-PWAT].
198. House of Commons, Apply Without Fear: Special Immigration Measures for Nationals of Haiti
and Zimbabwe: Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 42:1 (May 2016)
at 3 (Chair: Borys Wrzesnewskyj).
199. Ibid at 4. These figures are based on IRCC estimates from data on failed refugee claims. As
Canada does not track data on those exiting the country, for example, voluntarily, there is no way to
know the exact number of people who would have been affected by the lifting of the TSR.
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policy giving Haitian nationals the opportunity to apply for permanent
resident status.200 Section 25.2(1) provides the minister with the authority
to grant permanent residence on the basis of public policy considerations
to individuals who would not otherwise qualify on H&C grounds.201 The
government also prevented deportations by administratively deferring
removals for Haitians who submitted an H&C application within the time
the temporary policy was in effect.202 More recently, the Government of
Canada has implemented a public policy to provide work permits to certain
Hong Kong residents after China’s adoption of a national security law in
Hong Kong, which came into force on 30 June 2022,203 and to facilitate
permanent residence for foreign national family members of victims of two
recent air disasters with significant implications for Canadians: Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302 and Ukrainian International Airlines Flight PS752.204
In addition to issuing public policies on humanitarian and
compassionate considerations, the government may also issue temporary
resident permits (TRPs) to foreign nationals who are inadmissible to
Canada or do not meet regular immigration requirements where it is
“justified in the circumstances.”205 TRPs are, however, discretionary and
generally only issued in exceptional circumstances and at the discretion of
the processing officer.206 They may be cancelled at any time and generally
do not permit a holder to work or study without a work or study permit.207
TSRs, public policies, and TRPs are all protections that do not require
legislative changes and could be extended to individuals displaced by
200. IRPA, supra note 165, s 25; “Operational Bulletin 600-A” (20 July 2016), online: Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/
publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/bulletins-2016/600-modified-july-20-2016.
html> [perma.cc/HD3M-9MR3] [IRCC, “Bulletin 600-A”].
201. IRPA, supra note 165 at section 25.2(1).
202. IRCC, “Bulletin 600-A,” supra note 201.
203. “Updated: Temporary public policy to exempt certain Hong Kong residents from work permit
requirements” (last modified 8 June 2021), online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operationalinstructions-agreements/public-policies/hong-kong-residents-open-work-permit-updated.html>
[perma.cc/MU3F-UU7R].
204. “Temporary public policy to facilitate issuance of permanent resident visas for certain foreign
nationals outside Canada who are members of the families of Canadian victims of recent air disasters”
(last modified 8 August 2022), online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructionsagreements/air-disaster-public-policy-outside-canada.html> [perma.cc/VX26-46JG]..
205. IRPA, supra note 165 at s 24(1).
206. “Guide 5554: Applying to remain in Canada as a temporary resident permit holder” (last
modified 5 December 2019), online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.canada.
ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/guide-5554applying-remain-canada-temporary-resident-permit-holder.html#5554E2> [perma.cc/MU2C-MBP6].
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climate change through policy direction or regulatory changes. But the
difficulty with such special measures is their ad hoc nature.208 Whether a
TSR or public policy is issued for a country is left to the discretion of the
minister of immigration, refugees and citizenship. Similarly, TRPs are left
to the discretion of IRCC officers. There is no guarantee or way to ensure
that the minister would implement measures similar to those implemented
after the 2010 Haiti earthquake for future climate-related disasters.209
This leaves the process open to politicized and arbitrary decisions about
which countries are added to the list and what will happen when the TSR
is lifted.210
Critics have also highlighted that their temporary nature makes
TSRs, public policies, and TRPs appealing politically but insecure for
individuals.211 People are both protected and unprotected in the sense that
they have no guaranteed long-term avenues to legal status, leaving them
in a “legal limbo.” In the case of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, a Report
of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration found that
administrative burdens associated with the cost and process of applying
and re-applying for temporary health and work permits interfered with
individuals’ ability to secure and maintain employment while in Canada.212
As such, the Committee recommended that when such short-term status
solutions are used, the government should also consider reducing such
burdens by extending the validity of work permits and removing other
barriers to short-term integration and contribution.213 If the above measures
are used in the future, the federal government should consider the lessons
of the experience following the 2010 Haiti earthquake when setting them
up.
4. Community sponsorship programs
Finally, Canada could also capitalize on existing community sponsorship
programs to address pathways for those migrating due to risk to life caused
by climate change. Sections 12 and 13(1) of IRPA establish Canada’s
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sponsorship framework.214 Under section 12(3) of IRPA, an individual
may be sponsored if they are considered to be a “Convention refugee”
or member of the country of asylum class.215 The regulations under IRPA
establish that “a person in similar circumstances to those of a Convention
refugee [who] is a member of the country of asylum class” may be granted
protection.216 A person is considered to be a member of the country of
asylum class if:
(1) they have fled their country of origin and therefore are outside of
all of their countries of nationality or habitual residence,
(2) they have been, and continue to be, seriously and personally
affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of human
rights in each of those countries, and
(3) they do not have a prospect of another durable solution, within a
reasonable time, that is:
a. they cannot return to their countries of nationality or habitual
residence
b. they cannot resettle in their country of asylum; and
c. they cannot resettle in a third country other than Canada.217
To be considered “seriously and personally affected,” an applicant
must have been and must continue to be “personally subjected to sustained
and effective denial of a basic human right.”218 IRCC guidelines go on to
state that human rights are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and ICCPR.219
These basic human rights are determined by the international
community, and include the right to life, although determination of
whether a right is violated is to be considered under Canadian law.220As
such, it appears that individuals in circumstances that trigger human rights
obligations as articulated in Teitiota could fall under the basic right to
life as determined by the international community. They could therefore
be eligible for private sponsorship through the humanitarian-protected
214. IRPA, supra note 165, ss 12(1) and 14(1).
215. Ibid, s 12(3).
216. IRPR, supra note 165, ss 146.
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online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/refugee-protection/
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persons abroad class, which grants permanent residency to members of
country of asylum class if they have been determined by an officer to need
resettlement because “they have been, and continue to be, seriously and
personally affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of
human rights in each of those countries.”221
To explicitly establish such a protection, as recommended by CARL,
the government could also introduce a humanitarian-protected persons
abroad class for individuals forced to flee their country of origin as a
result of climate change.222 Alternatively, they could expand the country
of asylum class under section 147(b) of the IRPR “to include victims of
climate-induced risks to life and security of the person.”223
At present, Canada has various community sponsorship programs,
including the Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program, the
Government Assisted Refugee (GAR) and the Visa-Office Referred
(VOR) or Blended Visa-Office Referred (BVOR) programs. Under the
PSR, Canadian sponsors identify individuals they wish to sponsor and
apply to the government for confirmation that their application meets the
requirements for sponsorship. By contrast, under the Government Assisted
Refugee (GAR) and Visa-Office Referred (VOR) or Blended Visa-Office
Referred (BVOR) programs, the UNHCR or a similar organization
identifies refugees who are either supported by the government (GAR)
or private sponsors (the VOR and BVOR).224 In 2019, the government
also introduced a new program to provide greater support for sponsorship
of individuals fleeing violence and persecution on the basis of their
sexual orientation or gender identity.225 It has also developed an Urgent
Protection Program (UPP) to provide rapid resettlement for UNHCRreferred refugees in need of urgent protection.226
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As stated above, the government could similarly introduce a program
aimed at protecting those who are forced to flee their countries of origin
because the impacts of climate change are such that their human rights have
been, and continue to be, seriously and personally affected. Otherwise,
individuals may still fall under the PSR, GAR, or BVOR programs
depending on whether they are considered a member of the country of
asylum class. The government could also directly create a new public
policy, as discussed above, for resettlement of individuals forced to flee
their countries of origin because of the impacts of climate change through
private sponsorship.
5. Ministerial instructions and section 48(2)
Under section 48(2) of IRPA, if a removal order is enforceable “the order
must be enforced as soon as possible.”227 Enforcement officers still hold,
however, a limited discretion to defer removals.228 The federal court has
held that an enforcement officer’s discretion to defer removal may entail
consideration of risks where removal “will expose the applicant to the risk
of death, extreme sanction or inhumane treatment,” but an officer is not
required to make or remake H&C decisions.229 An enforcement officer’s
decision to enforce a removal order must not violate the rights and values
entrenched under the Charter, including section 7, discussed above. To
ensure that enforcement officers’ removal decisions do not subject an
individual to a risk of life, liberty, or security of the person, ministerial
instructions could be used to ensure that officers consider such risks, in
particular in the context of climate change.230 In addition, this and any of
the above suggestions could be tested using a temporary pilot program,
which can be established by ministerial instruction and which are used to
attain immigration goals.
Conclusion
The impacts of the climate crisis are no longer abstract predictions. Pacific
Island nations such as Kiribati are the “canary in the coalmine,” but
individuals around the world are increasingly experiencing the effects of
climate change.231 Nonetheless, individuals forced to migrate on the basis
of climate change or natural disasters remain on the fringes of international
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and domestic protections. Without further development of states’ human
rights obligations, they are likely to stay there in increasing numbers. This
paper has looked at the issue in the Canadian context through analysis of
the Committee’s decision in Teitiota and its potential impact on Charter
interpretation and immigration law.
Teitiota helps us to understand the protections afforded under the
Refugee Convention and international refugee law on the one hand and
the ICCPR and international human rights law on the other. It illustrates
the limitations of the Refugee Convention in the context of climate- or
disaster-induced migration and the fact that many individuals will not be
able to avail themselves of refugee protections.232 Mr. Teitiota’s claim for
protection under article 6 of the ICCPR and its right-to-life provisions also
demonstrate failures of Canadian domestic law to implement obligations
under the ICCPR, which Canada has ratified and therefore pledged to follow.
With this in mind, part II of this paper analyzed the proper role of the
ICCPR in Charter interpretation, while part III demonstrated the avenues
through which Charter jurisprudence can and, it is argued, should be
developed to ensure consistency with Canada’s human rights obligations
in the climate change context.233 To demonstrate that section 7 is broad
enough to encompass protections for individuals seeking asylum on
this basis, this paper examined the case law under section 7 involving
deportation, extradition, the environment, and climate change. As argued,
these cases support the position that the right to life, liberty, and security
of the person can be engaged when noncitizens seek to challenge the
consequences of their removal from Canada.
Beyond the Charter, the final section of this paper outlined a series
of recommendations through which Parliament can begin to address the
issue of displacement forced by climate change. Several tools are already
at the government’s disposal or can be added seamlessly into the current
immigration framework. The government’s actions after the earthquake in
Haiti and its use of TSRs provide a helpful precedent from which to learn
and build a more comprehensive framework as well as incorporating the
use of public policies, TRPs, and supplemental guidelines for IRB, IRCC,
and CBSA officers.
Without further action, individuals forced to migrate as a result of
environmental risks or harms will be overlooked by Canada’s current
immigration and refugee laws. The absence of an international framework
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in this context should not be considered a barrier to action by this country.234
Given the current political climate and the polarization of public opinion
on migration issues over the last few years, it is unlikely the international
community will agree in the foreseeable future to expand protections under
the 1951 Refugee Convention to include climate-induced migration, or
will develop a new agreement around this issue. It appears then that states
and domestic courts will be forced to choose whether to take jurisdiction
or wash their hands of it.
Any changes are likely to be politically divisive and hard won. The
difficulty in coming to agreement on how to address the problem does
not, however, belay the importance of action. Preparation and planning
for how climate change will impact migration patterns in the coming years
are essential to a just and equitable response. Examination of the impacts
of current laws around migration, including gaps affecting those forced to
migrate as a result of climate change and other environmental factors, is
therefore key to responding in a manner that is consistent with Canada’s
international obligations.
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